Declaratory Judgments and the Application of the Statute of Limitations – A Nationwide Examination
Declaratory Judgments and the Application of the Statute of Limitations – A Nationwide Examination
The following is a nationwide examination of the Statute of Limitations as it applies to Declaratory Judgment Actions. Declaratory Judgment Actions are utilized to determine insurance coverage issues and to prevent bad faith allegations. Filing a declaratory judgment action can also provide a litigant with tactical benefits including litigation control to preempt future litigation and forum selection, which may provide favorable law as applied to the relevant issues of the case, as well as convenience to the client. The following nationwide examination is a tool to aid insurance professionals on issues related to insurance coverage. Please note that the following is a brief overview. Every case is different, and we should be consulted for further analysis on pending actions.
Upon review, if you have any further questions or concerns as to how this nationwide examination of Declaratory Judgments and the application of the Statute of Limitations thereto may apply to your company, we, at Thomas Paschos & Associates, P.C. would be glad to speak with you. One of our attorneys specializing in this field can speak with you today about our services. Contact Thomas Paschos & Associates, P.C. for more information. We can be reached at 856-354-1900 or 267-205-2444. You can also contact Thomas Paschos, Esq. at TPaschos@pascholaw.com.
Alabama
“Alabama courts have applied the rule of repose to declaratory judgment actions and looked to the date by which the claims could first have been brought when applying the rule of repose.” See Protopas v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-33-RDP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81896, at *11 n.7 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2021)(citing Tierce, 624 So.2d at 554-55); see also Protopas v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-33-RDP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81896, at *16 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2021)(citing Tierce, 624 So.2d at 554 ( “[T]he rule of repose…bars actions that have not been commenced within 20 years from the time they could have been commenced.”).) “When applying the rule of repose to declaratory judgment claims, Alabama courts have determined that the twenty-year clock begins whenever an action for declaratory judgment could have first been brought by any entity (not just the plaintiff).” See Protopas v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 2:21-CV-33-RDP, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81896, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2021)(citing Tierce v. Ellis, 624 So.2d 553 (Ala. 1993).)
Alaska
“We have similarly described the Declaratory Judgment Act as adding “another remedy to existing legal and equitable remedies.”” See Laverty v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 730 (Alaska 2000)(citing Jefferson, 458 P.2d at 997.) “These characterizations cause a problem when the affirmative defense of laches is raised against a claim for declaratory relief, since laches is an equitable defense against equitable causes of action, but not a legal defense against actions at law.” See Laverty v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 730 (Alaska 2000)(citing Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1325 n.1 (Alaska 1997).) “Courts often resolve this problem by looking to the circumstances surrounding the claim and applying laches if the claim would have arisen in equity before declaratory judgment was available.” See Laverty v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 13 P.3d 725, 730 (Alaska 2000)(citing KLLM, Inc. Employee Health Protection Plan v. Ontario Community Hosp., 947 F. Supp. 262 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (“examining nature of underlying issues to determine how they would have arisen had Congress not enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act”).)
Arizona
“Because Arizona has no statute of limitations expressly applicable to declaratory judgment actions, our courts have determined the appropriate limitations period by “examining the substance of that action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought.”” See Canyon del Rio Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, 227 Ariz. 336, 341, 258 P.3d 154, 159 (Ct. App. 2011)(citing Vales v. Kings Hill Condo. Ass’n, 211 Ariz. 561, 566, ¶ 17, 125 P.3d 381, 386 (App. 2005).) “Declaratory judgment claims filed within the relevant analogous limitations period are treated as timely.” See Canyon del Rio Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, 227 Ariz. 336, 341, 258 P.3d 154, 159 (Ct. App. 2011)(citing La Canada Hills Ltd. P’ship v. Kite, 217 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 9, 171 P.3d 195, 198 (App. 2007).)
Arkansas
“Declaratory relief is dependent on—and not available in the absence of—a justiciable controversy and is intended to supplement, rather than supersede, ordinary causes of action.” See Camp Nine Co. v. Firehunt, Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 421, ¶ 6, 676 S.W.3d 284, 289 (Ct. App.)(citing Dye v. Diamante, 2017 Ark. 42, 510 S.W.3d 759.) “Thus, we look at the underlying causes of action in the complaint to determine if any statute of limitations applies.” See Camp Nine Co. v. Firehunt, Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 421, ¶ 6, 676 S.W.3d 284, 289 (Ct. App.).
California
“Both mandamus and declaratory judgment are remedies available to enforce a variety of obligations; choice of the statute of limitations applicable to these remedies depends on the right or obligation sought to be enforced, and the statute’s application generally follows its application to actions for damages or injunction on the same rights and obligations.” See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of La Habra, 25 Cal. 4th 809, 821, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 377, 23 P.3d 601, 608 (2001)(citing 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Actions, §§ 624- 625, pp. 802-806.)) “Thus, a declaratory judgment action or mandate petition to enforce a statutory liability must be brought within the same three-year period after accrual of the cause of action ( Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (a)) as an action for damages or injunction on the same liability.” See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of La Habra, 25 Cal. 4th 809, 821, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 369, 377, 23 P.3d 601, 608 (2001) (citing Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 438, 462-464 [326 P.2d 484]; Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs. (1941) 18 Cal. 2d 427, 429-430 [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800].))
Colorado
“A claim for a declaratory judgment has no fixed applicable statute of limitations;” See W. Coast Servicing, Inc. v. Mascio, 2015 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 2499, *9(citing Harrison v. Pinnacol Assurance, 107 P.3d 969, 972 (Colo. App. 2004); XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LC, 2014 WL 4548532, *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014).) “What determines the applicable limitations period is the nature of the cause of action.” See W. Coast Servicing, Inc. v. Mascio, 2015 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 2499, *9(citing XY, LLC, 2014 WL 4548532 at *3; see also Harrison, 107 P.3d at 972 “(limitations period applicable to declaratory judgment actions is determined through reference to a specific remedial theory).”)
Connecticut
“In analyzing whether a declaratory judgment action is barred by a particular statutory period of limitations, a court must examine the underlying claim or right on which the declaratory action is based. . . . It necessarily follows that if a statute of limitations would have barred a claim asserted in an action for relief other than a declaratory judgment, then the same limitation period will bar the same claim asserted in a declaratory judgment action.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)” See Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 253 Conn. 531, 536-37, 754 A.2d 153, 156 (2000)(citing Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 115-16, 617 A.2d 433 (1992).)
Delaware
“”[A] three-year statute of limitation under 10 Del. C. § 8106 governs breach of contract claims,” as well as statutory claims such as [a] declaratory judgment action [].” See Crowhorn v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 178, *17(citing Mentis v. Delaware Am. Life Ins. Co., 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 419, 1999 WL 74430 at *8 (Del. Super. Ct.).) “Delaware allows claims for declaratory relief to be brought both in equity and at law.” See Whittington v. Dragon Grp., L.L.C., 991 A.2d 1, 9 n.20 (Del. 2009)(citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 6501 (1999).) “Under Delaware law, a contract under seal is subject to a twenty-year statute of limitations.” See Whittington v. Dragon Grp., L.L.C., 991 A.2d 1, 10 (Del. 2009)(citing Aronow Roofing Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 902 F.2d 1127, 1127-28 (3d Cir. 1990).)
District of Columbia
§ 12-301. Limitation of time for bringing actions.
[(a)] Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, actions for the following purposes may not be brought after the expiration of the period specified below from the time the right to maintain the action accrues:
(1) for the recovery of lands, tenements, or hereditaments— 15 years;
(2) for the recovery of personal property or damages for its unlawful detention— 3 years;
(3) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real or personal property— 3 years;
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment— 1 year;
(5) for a statutory penalty or forfeiture— 1 year;
(6) on an executor’s or administrator’s bond— 5 years; on any other bond or single bill, covenant, or other instrument under seal— 12 years;
(7) on a simple contract, express or implied— 3 years;
(8) for which a limitation is not otherwise specially prescribed— 3 years;
(9) for a violation of § 7-1201.01(11)— 1 year;
(10) for the recovery of damages for an injury to real property from toxic substances including products containing asbestos— 5 years from the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should have been discovered;
(11) for the recovery of damages arising out of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was less than 35 years of age— the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later;
(12) for the recovery of damages arising out of sexual abuse that occurred while the victim was 35 years of age or older— 5 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.
[(b)] This section does not apply to actions for breach or contracts for sale governed by § 28:2-725, nor to actions brought by the District of Columbia government.
See D.C. Code § 12-301 (Lexis Advance through May 2, 2024.)
Florida
“”Declaratory judgment actions are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.”” See Lakeside v. Charlotte County, 2023 Fla. Cir. LEXIS 683, *8(citing Manatee Cty. v. Mandarin Development, Inc., 301 So. 3d 372, 375-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (citing Section 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat); see Pozo v. Sunset Real Estate Partners, 322 So. 3d 1236, 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (same).)
Georgia
“…[E]ven though the Declaratory Judgment Act does not include a specific statute of limitation, declaratory judgment actions generally are subject to statutory limitation periods.” See Gardei v. Conway, 313 Ga. 132, 137, 868 S.E.2d 775, 779 (2022.) “…[S]everal federal appellate courts have concluded that actions “for declaratory relief will be barred to the same extent the applicable statute of limitations bars the concurrent legal remedy.”” See Gardei v. Conway, 313 Ga. 132, 137, 868 S.E.2d 775, 779 (2022)(citing Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 126 F3d 178, 181 (II) (3d Cir. 1997))(other citations omitted.) “…[I]n declaratory judgment actions, the statute of limitation for the analogous legal remedy will also apply to the declaratory judgment action.” See Gardei v. Conway, 313 Ga. 132, 138, 868 S.E.2d 775, 780 (2022.)
Hawaii
“…HRS § 632-1 does not impose any time limitations on declaratory judgment actions.” See Alaka’i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi, 127 Haw. 263, 301, 277 P.3d 988, 1026 (2012.) “It would appear that a declaratory judgment action challenging an agency’s reconsideration decision on a procurement protest would be subject to the general statutes of limitations set forth in HRS chapter 657, which may be as long as six years.” See Alaka’i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi, 127 Haw. 263, 301, 277 P.3d 988, 1026 (2012)(citing HRS § 657-1(4) (1993) (“providing a six year statute of limitations for “[p]ersonal actions” not otherwise covered by the laws of the State”).)
Idaho
“Recognizing that a claim for declaratory judgment depends on existing substantive rights, courts examine the underlying substance of the claim to determine the applicable statute of limitations.” See Sommer v. Misty Valley, Ltd. Liab. Co., 170 Idaho 413, 421, 511 P.3d 833, 841 (2021.) “The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States that limitations periods under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act depend on the substantive claim, not the remedy: Declaratory relief is a mere procedural device by which various types of substantive claims may be vindicated. There are no statutes which provide that declaratory relief will be barred after a certain period of time. Limitations periods are applicable not to the form of relief but to the claim on which the relief is based.” See Sommer v. Misty Valley, Ltd. Liab. Co., 170 Idaho 413, 421, 511 P.3d 833, 841 (2021)(citing 312 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1963).) “…[S]o long as the claim for declaratory relief is justiciable, it may be brought before the statute of limitations begins to run on an underlying cause of action.” See See Sommer v. Misty Valley, Ltd. Liab. Co., 170 Idaho 413, 424, 511 P.3d 833, 844 (2021.)(citing Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1232 (2006) (“dealing with standing and ripeness”).) “…[A] claim for declaratory relief brought in the period prior to accrual of the underlying cause of action is not subject to an applicable statute of limitations.” See Sommer v. Misty Valley, Ltd. Liab. Co., 170 Idaho 413, 424, 511 P.3d 833, 844 (2021.)
Illinois
“We believe that a declaratory judgment action that seeks a declaration of the rights of parties pursuant to a written contract should not be analogized to a civil rights action.” See Emp’rs Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 309 Ill. App. 3d 730, 748, 243 Ill. Dec. 384, 397-98, 723 N.E.2d 687, 700-01 (1999.) “There is no question that the rights and liabilities of the parties to a civil rights action derive solely from the statute that creates it.” See Emp’rs Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 309 Ill. App. 3d 730, 748, 243 Ill. Dec. 384, 398, 723 N.E.2d 687, 701 (1999.) “However, the rights and liabilities of the parties to a contract who seek declaratory judgment relief do not derive from the statute that creates declaratory judgment actions.” See Emp’rs Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 309 Ill. App. 3d 730, 748, 243 Ill. Dec. 384, 398, 723 N.E.2d 687, 701 (1999.) “Rather, those rights and liabilities derive from the contract which creates them.” See Emp’rs Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 309 Ill. App. 3d 730, 748, 243 Ill. Dec. 384, 398, 723 N.E.2d 687, 701 (1999.) “For that reason, the declaratory judgment action that seeks construction of a contract should be subject to the statute of limitations for written contracts, namely, section 13-206 of the Code.” See Emp’rs Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 309 Ill. App. 3d 730, 748, 243 Ill. Dec. 384, 398, 723 N.E.2d 687, 701 (1999)(footnote omitted.) “Support for the conclusion that the ten-year statute of limitations applies to declaratory judgment actions that seek a declaration of the rights and liabilities of the parties to an insurance contract can be found in Shelton v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 652, 515 N.E.2d 235, 113 Ill. Dec. 426 (1987).” See Emp’rs Ins. v. Ehlco Liquidating Tr., 309 Ill. App. 3d 730, 748-49, 243 Ill. Dec. 384, 398, 723 N.E.2d 687, 701 (1999.)
Indiana
“But to bring a declaratory judgment action under the DJA, a party must first satisfy certain criteria.” See Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1284 (Ind. 2022.) “Section 34-14-1-2 of the DJA establishes who may seek a declaratory judgment: Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” See Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1284 (Ind. 2022)(citing I.C. § 34-14-1-2.) “Notably, though the Legislature did not define what it meant to be “affected by a statute” under the second requirement, we find it requires a plaintiff must have standing and that their claims must be ripe.” See Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1284-85 (Ind. 2022)(citing Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186, 189 (1930).) “Standing asks whether a litigant is entitled to have a court decide the substantive issues of the claims presented, Solarize Ind., Inc. v. So. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022), while ripeness asks whether the claim is sufficiently developed to merit judicial review, Indiana Dep’t of Envtl. Management v. Chemical Waste Management, 643 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Ind. 1994).” See Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1285 (Ind. 2022.)
Iowa
“”When disagreement arises as to which of the several periods of limitation contained in Iowa Code section 614.1 is applicable, we must determine . . . which of the types of actions described in the statute most nearly characterizes the action before the court.”” See Kostoglanis v. Yates, 956 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Iowa 2021)(citing Scott v. City of Sioux City, 432 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 1988).) “In making that determination, we look to “[t]he actual nature of the action.”” See Kostoglanis v. Yates, 956 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Iowa 2021)(citing Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa 1994).) “The question “turns on the nature of the right sued upon and not on the elements of relief sought for the claim.”” See Kostoglanis v. Yates, 956 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Iowa 2021)(citing Id.) In determining the appropriate statute of limitations for a specific cause of action, the Code requires us to look to the foundation of the action. This means that the appropriate statute of limitations is to be ascertained by characterizing the actual nature of the action. See Kostoglanis v. Yates, 956 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Iowa 2021)(citing Sandbulte v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins., 343 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1984) (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds by Langwith v. Am. Nat’l Gen. Ins., 793 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 2010), superseded by statute, 2011 Iowa Acts ch. 70, § 45 (codified at Iowa Code § 522B.11(7) (2013)).)
Kansas
See Murray v. Miracorp, Inc., 545 P.3d 1009, 1019 (Kan. 2024)(citing K.S.A. 60-513 (“two-year limit for bringing … declaratory-judgment actions”.)
Kentucky
“Our Supreme Court has held that the underlying theory of law asserted in the petition determines what statute of limitations applies to declaratory judgment actions.” See Corinth Estates v. Corinth Shore Estates, No. 2021-CA-0732-MR, 2023 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 39, at *7 (Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2023)(citing Million v. Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Ky. 2004).) “KRS 418.040 does not set out a standard statute of limitations for all declaratory judgment actions, and indeed, this Court has never specifically addressed the issue as it pertains to inmate litigation”, but “[w]e conclude, however, that the underlying theory of law asserted in the petition determines what statute of limitations should apply.” See Million v. Raymer, 139 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Ky. 2004.)
Louisiana
“Louisiana law provides no prescriptive period specifically applicable to a declaratory judgment action”; “Instead, courts must look to the cause of action that forms the underlying basis of the request in determining which prescriptive period applies.” See Friel v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 2011-1032 ( La. App. 4 Cir 02/08/12), 85 So. 3d 180, 182(citing Brown v. Schreiner, 2011 WL 5394732, 81 So. 3d 705, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1351 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/9/11); dela Vergne v. dela Vergne, 99-0364, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/17/99), 745 So.2d 1271, 1275.)
Maine
“Actions for declaratory judgment are also governed by the same six-year statute of limitations and accrue when a plaintiff receives a judicially cognizable injury.” See Baroudi v. Maselli, 2016 Me. Super. LEXIS 144, *6(citing Bog Lake Co. v. Town of Northfield, 2008 ME 37, ¶¶ 7-9, 942 A.2d 700.)
Maryland
“We are of the opinion that the period of limitations applicable to ordinary actions at law and suits in equity should be applied in like manner to actions for declaratory relief.” See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 116 Md. App. 605, 659, 698 A.2d 1167, 1193 (1997.)
Massachusetts
“There is no statute of limitations applicable to declaratory actions; instead, the Court looks to the statute that applies to the underlying dispute.” See Connor v. DA, 34 Mass. L. Rep. 272 (2017)(citing Page v. LeRoux, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 708, 711, 685 N.E.2d 1205 (1997).) “The statute of limitations begins when an actual controversy arises between the parties creating a right to secure a judicial declaration.” See Connor v. DA, 34 Mass. L. Rep. 272 (2017)(citing Naranjo v. Dep’t of Revenue, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 260, 268, 825 N.E.2d 1051 (2005).)
Michigan
“Limitations statutes do not apply to declaratory judgments as such.” See Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v. Wayne Cty., 450 Mich. 119, 128, 537 N.W.2d 596, 601 (1995)(citing [Luckenbach Steamship Co v United States, 312 F.2d 545, 548 (CA 2, 1963).]) “There are no statutes which provide that declaratory relief will be barred after a certain period of time.” Id. “Limitations periods are applicable not to the form of the relief but to the claim on which the relief is based.” Id. “Once a court determines which statute of limitations applies, however, the time at which the claim accrues for purposes of applying that statute depends on the type of relief sought.” See Taxpayers Allied for Constitutional Taxation v. Wayne Cty., 450 Mich. 119, 128 n.10, 537 N.W.2d 596, 601 (1995.)
Minnesota
“…[S]tatutes of limitations apply to a declaratory judgment action “to the same extent” as a nondeclaratory proceeding based on the same cause of action.” See Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC, 821 N.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Minn. 2012)(citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 108 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Wilson, 617 A.2d at 436 (“stating that when “a statute of limitations would have barred a claim asserted in an action for relief other than a declaratory judgment, then the same limitation period will bar the same claim asserted in a declaratory judgment action.”).”) “[In determining whether a party timely filed a declaratory judgment action, the court examines] the essence or “gravamen of the action” to determine which, if any, statutes of limitations apply.” See Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs., LLC, 821 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. 2012)(citing Portlance, 405 N.W.2d at 243; see also Park Nicollet Clinic, 808 N.W.2d at 832 (“”When addressing a question as to the statute of limitations, we typically first determine which statute of limitations applies to the claims asserted.” (emphasis added)).”)
Mississippi
“The language of Rule 57, Miss. R. Civ. P., and its Comment are instructive.” See Riley v. Moreland, 537 So. 2d 1348, 1353 (Miss. 1989.) “The rule provides in relevant part: RULE 57. DECLANATORY JUDGMENTS (a) Procedure. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions may declare rights, status, and other legal relations regardless of whether further relief is or could be claimed. The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment where such judgment, if entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. * * * The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in actions where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for declaratory judgment and may advance it on the calendar. The judgment in a declaratory relief action may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect.” See Riley v. Moreland, 537 So. 2d 1348, 1353 (Miss. 1989.)
Missouri
“Generally, a statute of limitations commences running when the right to bring a suit accrues.” See Beavers v. Rec. Ass’n of Lake Shore Estates, 130 S.W.3d 702, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)(citing Kennedy v. Microsurgery & Brain Research Inst., 18 S.W.3d 39, 42 (Mo.App. 2000).) “The right to bring a suit for declaratory judgment accrues when there exists: “(1) ‘a legally-protected interest’; (2) ‘a justiciable controversy which presents a real, substantial, presently-existing dispute as to which specific relief is sought’; (3) that the question presented is ‘ripe for judicial determination’; and (4) that the pleader has ‘no adequate remedy at law.'”” See Beavers v. Rec. Ass’n of Lake Shore Estates, 130 S.W.3d 702, 715-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)(citing Westphal v. Lake Lotawana Ass’n, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo.App. 2003) (quoting Wheeler v Sweezer, 65 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Mo.App. 2002)).) “”‘With respect to proceedings for a declaratory judgment . . . the statute of limitations does not begin to run until an actual controversy has occurred.'”” See Beavers v. Rec. Ass’n of Lake Shore Estates, 130 S.W.3d 702, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)(citing M. H. Siegfried Real Estate, Inc. v. Renfrow, 592 S.W.2d 488, 493 n.2 (Mo.App. 1979) (quoting Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 528 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir., 1975)) (alteration in original); see also Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18, 28, 29 (Mo. 1955).) “”‘A mere difference of opinion or disagreement on a legal question is insufficient, but parties must show that their rights and liabilities are affected.'”” See Beavers v. Rec. Ass’n of Lake Shore Estates, 130 S.W.3d 702, 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)(citing Kinder v. Holden, 92 S.W.3d 793, 804-05 (Mo.App. 2002) (quoting Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. banc 1996)).)
Montana
“…[A] declaratory judgment claim is subject to: the period of limitation that [would] appl[y] to the underlying action at law or suit in equity . . . . If a statute of limitations would bar the claim if asserted in an action seeking relief [on the same legal principles and predicate facts] other than [by] declaratory judgment, then the same limitation period would bar assertion of that claim in a declaratory judgment action.” See Fennessy v. Knight, 2021 MT 95N, ¶ 6, 404 Mont. 552, 485 P.3d 205(citing 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 120 (West 2016))((Cloud Found., Inc. v. Kempthorne, 546 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (D. Mont. 2008) (declaratory judgments are subject to applicable statutes of limitations) and City of St. Paul v. Evans, 344 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (statutes of limitation apply to declaratory judgment claims as well as “time-barred claims masquerading as [affirmative] defenses.”).)
Note: PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE MONTANA CODE SECTION THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Nebraska
“Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. Any action or proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment that any tax, penalty, or part thereof is unconstitutional shall be brought within twelve months after such tax or penalty was levied or assessed.” See Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann § 25-21149 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through Acts of the 2nd Regular Session of the 108th Legislature (2024)(other citations omitted.)
Nevada
“NRS 30.040(1) is part of Nevada’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.” See 5333 Spicebush Trust v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2019 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1246, *13. “The Act is silent as to any statute of limitations, and the Nevada Supreme Court has acknowledged declaratory actions do not always have a statute of limitations: “[N]o statutory limitation applies when a declaratory judgment will serve a practical end in determining and stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural question, either as to present or prospective obligations.”” See 5333 Spicebush Trust v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2019 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1246, *13(citing City of Fernley v. State, Dep’t of Tax, 366 P.3d 699, 706 (Nev. 2016) (citation omitted).) “Where parties’ “present or prospective” rights or obligations are unclear—as when a taxpayer does not know whether it must pay a tax it claims is unconstitutional—declaratory relief is not time-barred.” See 5333 Spicebush Trust v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2019 Nev. Dist. LEXIS 1246(citing Id. at 707-08.)
New Hampshire
“The six-month limitations period applicable to insurance coverage cases was created to eliminate inexcusable delays in filing pretrial declaratory judgment petitions regarding insurance coverage, which were impeding the progress of the underlying lawsuits.” See Craftsbury Co. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 N.H. 717, 719, 834 A.2d 267, 269 (2003)(citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 393, 396, 529 A.2d 915 (1987); see also Lynn, Declaratory Judgments in Insurance Cases: Recent Amendment Solves the “Where to Sue” Problem But Leaves the “When to Sue” Question Unresolved, 36 N.H.B.J. 58, 59 (March 1995).) “”The limitation period is enforced to encourage early determination of insurance coverage questions.”” See Craftsbury Co. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 N.H. 717, 719, 834 A.2d 267, 269 (2003)(citing Allstate, 129 N.H. at 396.) “There are only two exceptions to the six-month limitations period, and they are statutory: “A petition may be filed after the six-month period only when the facts giving rise to the coverage dispute become known to the insurer after the six-month period has run and were not reasonably discoverable by the insurer within the six-month period, or where the failure to file was the result of accident, mistake or misfortune.”” See Craftsbury Co. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 149 N.H. 717, 719, 834 A.2d 267, 269 (2003)(citing Hartford Ins. Co. v. Bird, 124 N.H. 784, 786, 480 A.2d 4 (1984) (quotation omitted); see RSA 491:22, III.)
New Jersey
“…[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62, does not contain a statute of limitations, and a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a legislative enactment is not ordinarily subject to a defense of laches.” See Ballantyne House Assocs. v. City of Newark, 269 N.J. Super. 322, 330, 635 A.2d 551, 555 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)(citing Cf. Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 14-15, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).)
New Mexico
“Declaratory actions are governed by the same limitations applicable to other forms of relief, since the nature of the right sued upon, and not the form of action or relief demanded, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations.” See Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 1967-NMSC-243, ¶ 6, 78 N.M. 460, 462, 432 P.2d 816, 818(citing Maguire v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc., supra; Leahey v. Department of Water and Power, 76 Cal.App.2d 281, 173 P.2d 69; Dunn v. County of Los Angeles, 155 Cal.App.2d 789, 318 P.2d 795.)
New York
In declaratory judgment actions, courts generally apply the six-year residuary–or catch- all–statute of limitations applicable to actions not expressly covered by statute. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1); see also Town of Hempstead v. AJM Capital II, LLC, 13 N.Y.S.3d 199 (2d Dep’t 2015). The residuary limitations provision does not automatically govern all declaratory actions. See Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 229 (1980). To determine if a specific statutory limitations period applies, the court must identify the plaintiff’s underlying: Claims –and–Relief sought. See Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 229 (1980). If the parties could resolve the declaratory judgment action’s underlying claims through a proceeding having a specific limitations period (e.g., an Article 78 proceeding), then that limitations period—not the residual period—will apply. See Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 229-30 (1980); Town of Hempstead v. AJM Capital II, LLC, 13 N.Y.S.3d 199, 201 (2d Dep’t 2015).
North Carolina
“…[D]eclaratory judgment actions are subject to the applicable statute of limitations, which is the one that governs the substantive right that is most closely associated with the declaration that is being sought.” See Chisum v. Campagna, 376 N.C. 680, 719, 855 S.E.2d 173, 199-200 (2021.)
North Dakota
“[There is] nothing in the Declaratory Judgment Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 32-23, requiring a third-party complaint actually be filed before an insurer can bring a declaratory judgment action to determine the duties to defend or indemnify.” See Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Horner, 1998 ND 168, ¶ 12, 583 N.W.2d 804, 807.
Ohio
“An action for a declaratory judgment is a civil action.” See Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 31, 158 Ohio St. 3d 398, 405, 144 N.E.3d 378, 387(citing Renee v. Sanders, 160 Ohio St. 279, 116 N.E.2d 420 (1953), paragraph one of the syllabus.) “”[U]nless a different limitation is prescribed by a statute, a civil action may be commenced only within the period prescribed in sections 2305.04 to 2305.22 of the Revised Code.”” See Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 31, 158 Ohio St. 3d 398, 405, 144 N.E.3d 378, 387(citing R.C. 2305.03(A).) “R.C. 2305.04 through 2305.131 set out statutes of limitations that apply to specific types of claims.” See Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 31, 158 Ohio St. 3d 398, 405, 144 N.E.3d 378, 387. “R.C. 2305.14 creates a catchall limitations period of ten years for those causes of action that do not fall within any of the types of claims specified in the other statutes.” See Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 31, 158 Ohio St. 3d 398, 405, 144 N.E.3d 378, 387. “Through R.C. 2305.03(A) and the catchall limitations period in R.C. 2305.14, the General Assembly has instructed that any civil action is subject to a statute of limitations.” See Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 31, 158 Ohio St. 3d 398, 405, 144 N.E.3d 378, 387.
Oklahoma
“…[T]his Court again held in Stephens v. General Motors Corp. 1995 OK 114, ¶8, 905 P.2d 797, 799 that:According to 12 O.S. Supp. 1993 §95, an action must be commenced within the relevant period “after the cause of action shall have accrued” or it is barred. The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues. A cause of action accrues when a litigant could first maintain an action to a successful conclusion. Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 191, 632 P.2d 368, 370 (Okl. 1980); Oklahoma Brick Corp. v. McCall, 1972 OK 70, 497 P.2d 215, 217 (Okl. 1972). Additionally, this court has held “that for the purposes of 12 O.S. 1981 §95 Third, a negligence claim accrues when any injury to the plaintiff, for which an action could proceed is certain and not merely speculative. M.B.A. Constr., Inc. v. Roy J. Hannaford Co., Inc., 1991 OK 87, 818 P.2d 469, 470 (Okl. 1991).” City of Tulsa v. Bank of Okla., N.A., 2011 OK 83, ¶ 21, 280 P.3d 314, 320.
Oregon
“There is no statute of limitations otherwise applicable to declaratory judgment actions.” See Doyle v. City of Medford, 271 Ore. App. 458, 464, 351 P.3d 768, 771 (2015)(footnote omitted.) “In this context, we conclude that the general residual ten-year limitation set forth in ORS 12.140 is applicable.” See Doyle v. City of Medford, 271 Ore. App. 458, 464-65, 351 P.3d 768, 771 (2015)(citing State ex rel Adult & Fam. Ser. v. Bradley, 58 Ore. App. 663, 670, 650 P2d 91 (1982), aff’d, 295 Ore. 216, 666 P2d 249 (1983) (“ORS 12.140 is the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action to which no other statute of limitations applies.”).) “ORS 12.140 provides: “An action for any cause not otherwise provided for shall be commenced within 10 years.”” See Doyle v. City of Medford, 271 Ore. App. 458, 465 n.4, 351 P.3d 768, 771 (2015.)
Pennsylvania
“First, declaratory judgment actions are subject to a four-year limitations period under Pennsylvania law.” See Green v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2017 PA Super 73, 158 A.3d 653, 660. “Second, this limitations period begins to run when a cause of action accrues.” See Green v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2017 PA Super 73, 158 A.3d 653, 660. “Third, a cause of action for declaratory judgment accrues when an actual controversy exists and an actual controversy exists only where a case presents clearly antagonistic positions or claims indicating imminent and inevitable litigation.” See Green v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2017 PA Super 73, 158 A.3d 653, 660.
Rhode Island
See Wilson v. City of Providence, No. PC-2022-01362, 2023 R.I. Super. LEXIS 72, at *11 (Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2023)(citing 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 182 (May 2023 Update) (“the statute of limitations applicable to a declaratory judgment claim is the one applicable to the underlying action”).)
South Carolina
“A declaratory judgment action is neither legal nor equitable per se”, but “[r]ather, its character is determined by the nature of the underlying issue.” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 506, 527 S.E.2d 765, 768-69 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991); Reyhani v. Stone Creek Cove Condominium II Horizontal Property Regime, 329 S.C. 206, 494 S.E.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1997).) “Courts “look to the kind of action in which the issue involved would have been decided if there were no declaratory judgment procedure.”” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 506, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Felts, 299 S.C. at 216, 383 S.E.2d at 263.) “Furthermore, “unless the cause of action and the relief sought in a declaratory judgment action are distinctly equitable, the action will be considered one at law.”” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 507, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Noisette, 299 S.C. at 247, 384 S.E.2d at 312; see also 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 105 (1956).); Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 507, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Felts, 303 S.C. at 356, 400 S.E.2d at 782 (“”An issue essentially one at law will not be transformed into one in equity simply because declaratory relief is sought.””).) “…[When an] underlying issue is one at law, [] a [statute of] limitations defense may be available to bar recovery.” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 508, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Medlin v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 325 S.C. 195, 480 S.E.2d 739 (1997); 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 108(b) (1956).) “The statute of limitations begins to run on a statutory liability at the time the cause of action accrues.” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 508, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Matthews v. City of Greenwood, 305 S.C. 267, 407 S.E.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1991).) “In analyzing a limitations defense, “the fundamental test for determining whether a cause of action has accrued is whether the party asserting the claim can maintain an action to enforce it.”” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 508, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Id. at 269, 407 S.E.2d at 669.) “Thus, a particular cause of action accrues “at the moment when the plaintiff has a legal right to sue on it.”” See Harvey v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 338 S.C. 500, 508, 527 S.E.2d 765, 769 (Ct. App. 2000)(citing Id. (citing Brown v. Finger, 240 S.C. 102, 124 S.E.2d 781 (1962)).)
South Dakota
“In City of Aberdeen v. Rich, this Court looked at the underlying cause of action and the relief sought to determine the applicable limitation period for bringing a declaratory judgment action challenging land transactions.” See McLaen v. White Twp., 2022 S.D. 26, ¶ 24 n.1, 974 N.W.2d 714, 723(citing 2001 S.D. 55, 625 N.W.2d 582.) See also McLaen v. White Twp., 2022 S.D. 26, ¶ 24 n.1, 974 N.W.2d 714, 723(citing 26 CJS Declaratory Judgments § 120 (“providing that “[g]enerally, the period of limitation applicable to the underlying action at law or suit in equity should be applied to an action for declaratory relief””).)
Tennessee
“Limitations statutes do not apply to declaratory judgments suits, as such, because a declaratory judgment action is a mere procedural device by which various types of substantive claims may be asserted.” See Dehoff v. Attorney General, 564 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1978)(citing Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1963).) “Accordingly, it is necessary to ascertain the nature of the substantive claims sought to be asserted in a declaratory judgment action in order to determine the appropriate statute of limitations.” See Dehoff v. Attorney General, 564 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1978.) “And, if a special statute of limitations applies to a special statutory proceeding, such as an election contest, it will be applied when a declaratory judgment action is employed to achieve the same result as the special proceeding.” See Dehoff v. Attorney General, 564 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1978)(citing Finlayson v. West Bloomfield Township, 320 Mich. 350, 31 N.W.2d 80 (1948); Campbell v. Nassau County, 273 App.Div. 785, 75 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1947); 22 Am.Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 78 (1965).)
Texas
“…[In] a declaratory judgment action authorized by TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.003 (Vernon 1997), a cause of action does not accrue until a justiciable controversy arises between the parties.” See Stone v. Simms, No. 06-00-00007-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 717, at *7 (Tex. App. Feb. 1, 2001)(citing El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Am. Petrofina Co. of Texas, 733 S.W.2d 541, 554 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).)
Utah
“The statute of limitations for a cause of action begins to run when “the cause of action has accrued.”” See Pinder v. Duchesne Cty. Sheriff, 2020 UT 68, ¶ 71, 478 P.3d 610, 625(citing Utah Code § 78B-2-102.) “The statute of limitations for both an inverse condemnation and a declaratory relief action is four years.” See Pinder v. Duchesne Cty. Sheriff, 2020 UT 68, ¶ 71, 478 P.3d 610, 625(citing Utah Code § 78B-2-307(3) (“”An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not otherwise provided for by law.””); Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Sys. L.C., 2000 UT 84, ¶¶ 15, 16, 12 P.3d 577 (“applying a four-year statute of limitations to an action for declaratory judgment”); Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. Co., 68 Utah 309, 249 P. 1036, 1041 (Utah 1926) (“applying a four-year statute of limitations to a takings claim”).)
Vermont
“The Declaratory Judgment Act, 12 V.S.A. §§ 4711-4725, gives the civil division general authority to grant declaratory and injunctive relief, but it “does not increase or enlarge the jurisdiction of the court over any subject matter or parties.”” See Otter Creek Solar LLC & PLH LLC v. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 2022 VT 60, ¶ 15, 295 A.3d 839, 844 (citing Vt. State Emps.’ Ass’n v. Vt. Crim. Just. Training Council, 167 Vt. 191, 194, 704 A.2d 769, 771 (1997).) “We have held that if the Legislature designates a specific procedure for bringing certain claims, “ ‘the declaratory judgments vehicle should not be used to frustrate that legislative choice.’ ”” See Otter Creek Solar LLC & PLH LLC v. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 2022 VT 60, ¶ 15, 295 A.3d 839, 844(citing Williams v. State, 156 Vt. 42, 58, 589 A.2d 840, 850 (1990) (quoting Trivento v. Comm’r of Corr., 135 Vt. 475, 478, 380 A.2d 69, 71-72 (1977)).)
Virginia
“The issue before the Court is what statute of limitations governs a declaratory judgment action.” See Kirchner v. McAninley, 79 Va. Cir. 222, 222 (Cir. Ct. 2009.) “The Supreme Court of Virginia in Board of Supervisors v. Thompson Associates, 240 Va. 133, 393 S.E.2d 201, 6 Va. Law Rep. 2664 (1990), held “the applicability of the statute of limitations is determined by the object of the litigation, not the form in which it is filed.” See Kirchner v. McAninley, 79 Va. Cir.222, 222 (Cir. Ct. 2009.) “If the law were otherwise, the statute of limitations could be rendered meaningless merely by the filing of a declaratory judgment action.”” See Kirchner v. McAninley, 79 Va. Cir. 222, 222 (Cir. Ct. 2009)(citing 240 Va. at 139 (citations omitted).)
Washington
““The UDJA does not have an explicit statute of limitations, but lawsuits under the UDJA must be brought within a ‘reasonable time.’”” See Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Am. Tower, Inc., 173 Wn. App. 154, 159, 293 P.3d 407, 410 (2013)(citing Auto. United, 175 Wn.2d at 541-42 (quoting Brutsche v. City of Kent, 78 Wn. App. 370, 376-77, 898 P.2d 319 (1995)).) ““‘What constitutes a reasonable time is determined by analogy to the time allowed for … a similar [action] as prescribed by statute, rule of court, or other provision.’”” See Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Am. Tower, Inc., 173 Wn. App. 154, 159, 293 P.3d 407, 410-11 (2013)(citing Cary v. Mason County, 132 Wn. App. 495, 501, 132 P.3d 157 (2006) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brutsche, 78 Wn. App. at 376-77).) “A declaratory judgment action must be brought within a reasonable time, determined by analogy to the limitation period for a similar suit.” See Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Am. Tower, Inc., 173 Wn. App. 154, 163, 293 P.3d 407, 412 (2013)(citing Auto. United, 175 Wn.2d at 541-42; Cary, 132 Wn. App. at 501.) “If more than one analogous limitation period applies, the longer one should be used.” See Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Am. Tower, Inc., 173 Wn. App. 154, 163, 293 P.3d 407, 412 (2013)(citing City of Federal Way, 62 Wn. App. at 538-39 (quoting Akada v. Park 12-01 Corp., 103 Wn.2d 717, 719, 695 P.2d 994 (1985)).)
West Virginia
“”‘Since proceedings for declaratory relief have much in common with equitable proceedings, the equitable doctrine of laches has been applied in such proceedings.'”” See Maynard v. Bd. of Educ., 178 W. Va. 53, 60, 357 S.E.2d 246, 254 (1987)(citing Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 622, 227 S.E.2d 576, 584 (1976), quoting 22 Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 78 (1965). See also E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 238, 240, 348 (2d ed. 1941)(“declaratory judgment actions are largely equitable in nature”).) “On the other hand, a party may obtain coercive relief, including damages, as well as declaratory relief, in a declaratory judgment action.” See Maynard v. Bd. of Educ., 178 W. Va. 53, 60-61, 357 S.E.2d 246, 254 (1987)(citing Syl. pt. 1, Torbett v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co., 173 W. Va. 210, 314 S.E.2d 166 (1983); W. Va. R. Civ. P. 57; W. Va. Code, 55-13-1 [1941].) “W. Va. Code, 55-2-12 [1959] provides, in pertinent part: “Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: . . . (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; . . . .”” See Maynard v. Bd. of Educ., 178 W. Va. 53, 56 n.4, 357 S.E.2d 246, 249 (1987.) “W. Va. Code, 55-2-6 [1931] provides, in pertinent part: Every action to recover money, which is founded upon . . . . any contract . . . . shall be brought within the following number of years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, that is to say: . . . . if it be . . . . upon a contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent, but not under seal, within ten years; . . . .” See Maynard v. Bd. of Educ., 178 W. Va. 53, 56 n.5, 357 S.E.2d 246, 249 (1987.) “”In order for the ten year statute of limitations to be applicable, there must be a contract in writing and the obligation or liability must grow immediately out of the written instrument and not remotely.”” See Maynard v. Bd. of Educ., 178 W. Va. 53, 58, 357 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1987)(citing Syl. (in part), Sansom v. Sansom, 148 W. Va. 603, 137 S.E.2d 1 (1964).)
Wisconsin
“We note that the Declaratory Judgment Act, found in Wis. Stat. § 806.04, provides no statute of limitations.” See E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. Cty. of Oneida, 2011 WI 71, ¶28, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 738, 800 N.W.2d 421, 430. “[Case law stating that the statute of limitations is inapplicable in certain declaratory judgment cases] does not apply in a case where a statute expressly authorizes certain governmental action and then additionally sets out a specific time limitation within which an aggrieved party must challenge such action.” See Ross v. Honey Lake Prot. & Rehab. Dist., 166 Wis. 2d 739, 744, 480 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Ct. App. 1992).
Wyoming
“The statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action is four years.” See Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, ¶ 27, 273 P.3d 1065, 1073(citing Cox, 79 P.3d at 509.) “Statutes of limitations are triggered in Wyoming when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of action.” See Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, ¶ 27, 273 P.3d 1065, 1073(citing Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶ 22, 208 P.3d 1296, 1304 (Wyo. 2009).) “That is, the statute begins to run when the claimant is chargeable with information which should lead him to believe he has a claim.” Id. “If the material facts are in dispute, the application of a statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact; otherwise, it is a question of law.” Id.
